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LESSONS FROM NIGERIA'S RECENT MONETARY
AND FISCAL POLICY EXPERIENCE
G. 0. Okah 1
Abstract
Unlike the lower animals which are biblically described
as being "instinctively wise·; humans can and should gain
from their own experiences to increase their knowledge of
the environment. The same thing applies to nations.
If there is need to look more inwards for the solutions of
domestic economic problems, a case is immediately made
for increasing our consciousness to draw useful lessons from
our national experiences. Policy design, implementation and
assessment can benefit from such lessons.
Since fiscal and monetary policy measures occupy an
important place in the country's overall economic
management effort, an appraisal of our experience in this
area will certainly provide useful insight into an
understanding of why we are where we are. That appears to
be the main focus of this paper.
Recently, the question of whether or not a central bank can
effectively control money supply was examined analytically.
[See (JO)]. A major conclusion from that analysis is that, given
the circumstances of underdevelopment, the traditional tools of
monetary management are largely irrelevant in less developed
countries and that the narrow-based "direct controls" approach
accounts for an insignificant proportion of the total factors
generating monetary instability. More importantly, from the
point of view of the present discussion, fiscal factors were
shown to be seriously implicated in the efficacy or otherwise of
monetary control measures.
It therefore becomes necessary to examine, together, the
impact of monetary and fiscal policy measures with a view to
judging the actual results against the stated policy objectives.
The purpose of such exercise would be to provide some basis
for drawing useful lessons which will serve as a guide for future
design of macro-economic management and control strategies
that are more relevant to the Nigerian economic environment.
To do this, one needs some form of discussion framework as
is done in Part I of this paper. In Part II recent policy objectives
and the measures taken to pursue those objectives are
summarised. An appraisal of these measures is attempted in
Part Ill, while lessons to be drawn from the results are discussed
in Part IV Part V contains a summary and conclusion.

I

to hitting the targets with the desired intensity and timeliness
in order to achieve the desired results. This is a very simplified
model. In reality, the chain can be very long. In some cases
several instruments are aimed at one target. Sometimes, one
instrument overshoots the target and another is needed to
ameliorate its effect. In yet other instances, a particular target
may be, for all practical purposes, unreachable. So target
number one may have to be hit first in the hope of eventually
influencing target number two. And there are chain reactions,
side effects, unintended consequences and sometimes
accidental successes. Then there are leads and lags.
The sum total of all this is that it is extremely difficult
to separate causes from consequences in the real world and
attribute success or failure to any set of policy objectives
without the risk of empirical contradiction. And, as if to
complicate matters further, econometricians are capable of
telling almost any economic story with the desired flavour
from a given set of data. If the picture painted so far creates a
certain amount of confusion in the mind of the reader, this
should be excusable and even expected given the dynamic
setting of the real world.
Economic policy practitioners, as different from
theoreticians, have discovered that most of the elegant
theoretical models often set up under certain "simplifying
assumptions" represent a substantial abstraction from the real
world in which everything seems to depend on everything
including itself! To bring some order into the apparent chaos,
we will explicitly introduce time into our discussion framework
and also be very selective in what to include in our analysis
thereby differentiating the very important from the
not-so-important. Thus in our discussion of the monetary and
fiscal policies of Nigeria, we shall limit ourselves to the key
issues that dominated the scene in recent years. And, as much
as possible, we shall try to be very specific in our definition of
goals and instruments.
Policy Targets

Usually, these are broad-based macro-economic aggregates
whose behaviour is deemed to indicate, in some way, welfare
benefits or disbenefits in the economic system. In the Nigerian
case, as indeed in many other cases, these include the following:
(a) Rate of inflation
(b) Growth of total output
(c)
Level of employment
(d) Index of industrial production
(e) Government budget deficit
(f)
Money supply
(g)
Bank credit
and (h) External trade balance.
Because ofideas policy makers have about how the economy
works, it is intended that when these target variables are
influenced in the desired direction, the economic welfare of
the citizens will improve. As a result one almost instinctively
looks at trends in these variables when assessing the health of
the national economy.

DISCUSSION FRAMEWORK

While fiscal and monetary policy measures are not the only
ones used in managing the national economy, they certainly
are the most important from the points of view of regularity,
periodicity and pervasiveness in application. In fact most other
policy areas such as industrial policy, agricultural development
policy, and incomes policy are directly related to, or extensions
of the framework of fiscal and monetary policy measures as
enunciated in the annual budgets. It is therefore necessary and
sufficient to use the package of monetary and fiscal policy
measures as framework for discussing the efficacy or otherwise
of general economic management strategies.
Generally, policy formulation and execution recognise that
there are goals (or targets) as well as tools (or instruments) of
policy. The idea is to manipulate the instruments with a view
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measure which may appear to run counter to the objective
of channelling more resources to the productive sectors, was
introduced in recognition of the reduced demand for credit by
the manufacturing industries due to the recession.
This is an illustration of how a trade-off may sometimes
have to be tolerated when policy objectives tend to conflict.
Loans and advances to indigenous borrowers were fixed at
80 per cent in 1983, and 90 per cent for 1984 and 1985. Sixteen
per cent of the total banks' loans and advances has to be granted
to the small-scale enterprises. This measure was aimed at
encouraging indigenous entrepreneurs who are often
handicapped by a shortage of funds.
The banks were directed to grant 30 per cent of the total
deposits collected through their rural branches as loans to the
customers in those rural areas in 1983 and 1984. The
percentage was raised to 40 per cent in 1985. This is to
encourage the rural populace to increase their production in
agriculture and small-scale industries. It will also serve the
additional purpose ofreducing the burden of the rural dwellers
in financing urban-based businesses.
In addition, the liquidity ratio of commercial banks is being
regulated. The banks have been required to maintain a liquidity
ratio of 25 per cent during the entire period under review.
Similarly, the cash deposits ratio has been retained between 2
and 5 per cent. The banks have also been required to maintain
the ratio between the adjusted capital funds and total loans
and advances at one to twelve ( 1: 12) during the period.
Thirdly, a Compulsory Advance Deposits Scheme, which
was introduced in 1982, was retained for 1983. This measure
was adopted to restrict demand for imports. The required
deposit, which was a proportion of the import value, was
graduated in such a way that the less essential imports attracted
higher percentages of compulsory advance deposits. This
measure was discontinued in 1984 because some other
measures had been introduced to achieve the same objective.
This is an illustration of how the use of instruments may be
rationalised when the same objective can be achieved through
a less burdensome approach. On the other hand, importers and
industrialists had argued that the measure only amounted to
the idle tying down of precious funds since the deposits did
not earn any interest and could not be invested.
Finally, interest rates adjustment has been made use of to
achieve the stated objectives. In 1983 in particular, some
changes were made to the interest rates structure. The
Minimum Rediscount Rate was fixed at 8 per cent, Treasury
Bill issue rate was fixed at 7 per cent while Treasury Certificate
issue rate ranged from 7 '/, to 8 per cent. The commercial banks
deposits rates in 1983 ranged between 6 1/, to 8 per cent while
their lending rates from 6 to 13 per cent. In 1984, interest rates
were raised by about l 1/2 to 2 percentage points across the board,
except that the lending rate of 7 per cent for agriculture was
retained. Also the maximum lending rate of 13 per cent for all
purposes, obtained in 1983, was retained for 1984. The 1984
interest rates structure has been retained for 1985 except that
lending rates for agriculture were raised to between 8 and 9 per
cent.
The gradual increases in the interest rates were aimed at
encouraging institutionalised savings in the economy. It has
been the objective of the Government to encourage people to
save so that funds will be available for productive investment..
The increase in lending rates to the agricultural sector in 1985
has been aimed at encouraging banks to lend their funds to
that sector. It is common knowledge that the banks have not
been too keen over the years to lend funds for agricultural
purposes. Thus the emphasis seemed to have shifted from

Instruments of Policy

For the purpose of this exercise in which we want to focus
on monetary and fiscal policy measures, it may be useful to
list separately the monetary policy instruments and the fiscal
instruments. It is the attempt to manipulate these policy tools
that essentially constitutes conscious effort on the part of the
authorities to regulate the national economy. For monetary
regulations or control, use is made of the following. [See (5)].
(a) variable discount rate and the interest rate
structure
(b) open market operations
(c)
variable liquid assets ratio
~'---(d) cash ratio
(e) selective credit control
-.......__;;·
(f)
cash reserve requirements
(g)
special deposits
(h) moral suasion
and (i)
exchange rate control.
It is unusual to employ all the instruments simultaneously
with the same emphasis. Depending on the target of policy and
the ultimate objective within a given time variable
combinations are used.
For fiscal control, the Government uses the tax system
(direct and indirect), tarrifmeasures, budgetary measures and
import control.

II RECENT
MEASURES

MONETARY

AND

FISCAL

POLICY

Monetary Policy Measures

Monetary policy in recent years has been aimed principally
at solving the problems of price inflation, low industrial and
agricultural production, high rate of unemployment and an
unhealthy balance of payments position.
Other objectives of monetary policy during the period have
been to protect local industries from unfavourable foreign
competition and smugglers; to reduce indebtedness abroad and
to generate more revenue especially from the non-oil sector of
the economy.
Some of the monetary policy measures adopted to achieve
the stated objectives are the setting up of credit ceilings for
banks and a sectoral distribution of such credit. For example,
in 1983, the rate of aggregate credit expansion by the banks
was set at 25 per cent for big banks and at 35 per cent for the
small ones. In 1984, the Government decided to limit credit
expansion in the country especially to the "non-preferred"
sectors of the economy. To this end, the credit ceiling for the
big banks was reduced to 12.5 per cent while credit ceiling for
the small banks was reduced to 20 per cent during the same
period. In 1985, the banks' aggregate loans and advances were
not allowed to rise by more than 7 per cent over the outstanding
amount as at 31st December, 1984. All these have been aimed
at controlling money supply and through it, the rate of price
inflation in the economy, in the hope of favourably influencing
the economic welfare of the citizens.
Another objective of the Federal Government has been to
channel more financial resources to the productive sectors of
the economy. To this end, the share of agriculture in
commercial banks' loans and advances in 1983 was fixed at 10
per cent. This was also retained in 1984 but in 1985, the share
was raised to 12 per cent. During the 1983 and 1985 periods,
credit allocation to exports was reduced from 3 per cent in
1982 to 2 per cent for the years after. Similarly, the share of the
domestic trade was reduced from 11 to 10 per cent. In 1985,
the shares of manufacturing and services were reduced from
36 to 35 per cent and from 12 to 11 per cent respectively. This
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making funds more cheaply available to potential agricultural
investors to that of making the funding ofagricultural projects
more attractive to the suppliers offunds.

the non-oil sector of the economy. The range of import duties
was reduced from zero and 500 per cent to between 5 and 200
per cent in 1984 and this was to remain for a minimum of three
years. Some 38 items under Schedule II of the Tariff which
were granted duty exemption before 1984 were reduced to 20
items. Similarly, the general concessionary rates of duty under
which zero duty was granted to some manufacturers was
abolished. This measure was aimed at increasing Government
revenue and to reduce some notable malpractices that went
with the former practices. In order to increase Government
revenue, rates of duty of between 5 and 10 per cent were
introduced on some items which hitherto enjoyed low rates of
duty under the Approved User Scheme.
In order to encourage investment in agriculture and increase
local production of food and agricultural raw materials in
1984, duties on machinery and equipment for exclusive use
in agriculture were abolished. Similarly, duties on selected
imported agricultural products were raised. As exemptions,
import duties on wheat and tea were reduced and duties on
medical preparations, life-saving appliances, and medical
equipment were abolished in 1984. In order to standardise the
country's excise duties, it was decided that the base ofexcisable
products be expanded from 68 to 400 and that the products be
more clearly identified in terms of precise tariff description
than before.
Since it was stated in the 1984 Annual Budget customs and
excise tariffs would be unaltered for at least three years, the
1984 customs and excise tariffs also applied in 1985. However,
two fiscal measures were introduced in the 1985 budget which
are the Advance Payment of Custom Duty and the compulsory
payment ofa levy of:Nl00.00 on every air ticket for journeys
outside the African continent. The former is aimed at
minimizing fraud and the latter is aimed at increasing
Government revenue.

Fiscal Policy Measures
The fiscal policies of the Government during the period
under review have the same general thrust as the monetary
and economic policies of the Government some of which have
already been discussed. The general strategy has been that
of mutual reinforcement between fiscal and monetary policy
measures, more so as both now have the same time frame.
Essentially, the fiscal policy objectives since 1983 have been to
stimulate the expansion of agriculture and industry, to reduce
the level of price inflation, provide the necessary protection
for local industries, and to provide a suitable price incentive
framework in favour of increased agricultural and industrial
production. Other stated objectives have been to encourage the
local production of import-substitution goods by encouraging
local industries with heavy local material content, to encourage
the dispersal of industrial location, to discourage importation
of consumer goods which are available locally in order to
curtail outflow of foreign exchange, thereby improving the
balance of payments position; and to enhance government
revenue. While these objectives are many enough, an
examination of the measures actually taken will indicate which
objectives received greater emphasis.
The fiscal measures taken in pursuit of these objectives
include: the reduction of Government expenditure with a view
to reducing effective demand, thus moderating inflationary
pressures. In 1983, the Government made some effort to
reduce its total expenditure. The effort yielded an estimated
reduction in total Government expenditure of about NO. 7
billion from the 1982 level. Capital expenditure in 1984 was
limited to the on-going projects and no provision was made
for new ones. Furthermore, effort was made to streamline
capital projects in the country. Some projects that were not
considered to be of immediate benefit to the economy were
stopped and emphasis was placed on the ones that were
considered would be of help towards self-sufficiency in the
shortest possible time.
To further reduce Government total expenditure especially
on the recurrent account, substantial staff reductions were
made in Government ministries and parastatals. Recruitment
of new staff was limited to areas that seriously needed such
staff.
Plans were made to reduce wastage of both human and
material resources in all Government establishments. Thus a
start was made of a thorough rationalisation of Government
budgetary and administrative systems. These measures
continued into 1985 and in addition, Government announced
the cancellation or reduction of certain allowances hitherto
enjoyed by public servants.
Customs and excise tariffs have been re-organised. In 1983,
some 152 commodities were added to the list of items which
require Specific Import Licences. Industrial raw materials or
intermediate goods which hitherto were largely on the Open
General Licence were brought under Specific Import Licence in
order to enhance governmental control over foreign exchange
expenditure. Import duties on a number of items were also
raised by between IO and 150 per cent. A number of items were
re-classified and new rates of import tariffs of between 10 and
200 per cent were imposed.
In 1984, customs and excise tariffs were reformed to further
provide effective protection for local industries, to reduce the
level of unemployment, and to generate more revenue from

III APPRAISAL OF POLICY MEASURES
A minimum requirement for an objective performance
appraisal is the availability of pre-set performance standards
against which actual results are judged. This will usually
include prior agreement on the range and value of decision
variables as success criteria, the presence or absence of which
can be established with minimum equivocation. Such a test
scheme would minimize the input of value judgement,
intuition and educated guesses.
With the possible exception of the Monetary Authority's
credit guidelines which specify quantitative magnitudes for
changes in monetary variables, the policy objectives have
usually not been stated in language easily amenable to
quantifed testing.
Even the credit guidelines which contain quantitative
magnitudes have limited application in the assessment of
global economic performance, given the narrowness of their
base of application. They are at best good indicators of the
performance of the financial institutions that are being
regulated.
Another dimension to the appraisal problem is the difficulty
of differentiating the impact of one policy measure or set of
measures from that of others. Even the most rigorous analytical
techniques cannot sufficiently disentangle the maze of
inter-relationships and variously assign success or failure to
policy measures with a time-space dimension. It is even more
difficult empirically partly because of the observed real-world
situation in which failure tends to reinforce itself while, on the
other hand, it appears "nothing succeeds like success"!
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proportion of the GDP which the manufacturing sub-sector
represents. Its contribution is also heavily circumscribed by
its limited employment-generating capacity and exposure to
rather unfair international competition. What this means for
the efficacy of economic policy is that, even if it achieves
remarkable success in motivating this sub-sector, the leverage
it can have on total level of economic activity and therefore
the welfare of Nigerians, is somehow limited. In any case, the
mining sub-sector, with its negative growth rate during the past
six years (-5.1 per cent) has more than swamped whatever
contributions were made by manufacturing and electricity
generation in the industrial sector.

In the circumstances of economic and social
underdevelopment, these well-known problems are further
compounded by the lack ofadequate statistical data to measure
and determine the extent of failure or success. The quantity,
quality and timing ofavailable statistical information combine
to create a yawning gap between what is desirable and what is
possible.
One is thus left with the only feasible alternative: that of
using the scanty data available to assess, in a more-or-less
global sense, the lump-sum effect of all the policy measures
taken during a given period. While the loss of analytical rigour
is lamentable, the global approach has the advantage of
providing a needed summary index of the general direction in
which the economy appears to be moving - either for better
or for worse!
So, what has been the story told by our recent experience
in monetary and fiscal policy management? Have we been
achieving our objectives? Or, more generally, have we been
moving in the general direction of success? What do the signs
show? While these questions may be answered variously
depending on the angle from which an observer looks at our
economic performance, we elect here to answer these questions
by reference to selected indicators as measured by the available
data for recent years. These indicators are total output,
industrial production, prices, Government deficits and the
external current account balance.

Price Movements

One useful indicator of the level of monetary stability is the
general price level. To a great extent, it measures a relationship
between the quantity of money in circulation and the volume
of goods and services produced in the economy. So any policy
package designed to ameliorate inflationary pressures or ensure
monetary stability will have to do at least one of the following
things: ( 1) moderate the rate ofincrease of monetary aggregates,
(2) increase the supply of goods and services, (3) do both (1)
and (2) together, and (4) effect a more even distribution of what
goods and services are produced in the economy. It follows
that the effectiveness or otherwise of monetary and fiscal policy
measures is not independent of the behaviour of the general
price level.
Nigeria's inflation rate, as measured by the consumer price
index, between 1970 and 1985 fluctuated between the lowest
point of 3.2 per cent recorded in 1972 and the highest point of
39.6 per cent in 1984. (See Table 3). For the whole period, it
averaged out at 16.1 per cent. For the past six years it averaged
17.8 per cent, indicating a general upward trend. The implicit
GDP deflator (1977/78=100) averaged 14.4 per cent for the
period 1970 to 1985 and 7.3 per cent during the last six years.
(See Table 1). There is not enough data to decompose the
inflation rate into sectoral and socio-spatial elements. The
most that can be said for the inflation control effort in recent
years is that the results have been mixed.

Aggregate Output and Industrial Production

The gross domestic product (GDP) at constant 1977 /78
factor cost grew at an average rate of 2.3 per cent between
1970/71 and 1985. (See Table I). This growth rate of total
output is significantly lower than the estimated 2.5 per cent
annual population growth rate for the same period. This means
that the per capita real output has in fact been declining over the
period. When one adds the uneven socia-spatial distribution
pattern of the little real growth in aggregate output that took
place, one would begin to see the very adverse welfare
implications of a real negative per capita growth rate of total
output. As if that secular trend is not bad enough, the real
growth rate of total output between 1980 and 1985 has actually
been negative - an annual average of -2.7 per cent. This
means that real per capita output - given a population growth
rate of 2.5 per cent per annum - has actually declined by a
whole 5.2 per cent annually. That figure will definitely be higher
for many regions and economic and social groups.
Between 1980 and 1985, the index of industrial production
( 1972 = 100) declined from 190.8 to 168.4. (See Table 2). This
represents an average annual decline of 1. 9 per cent during the
period. Since the industrial sector usually gives leads in the
genesis and timing of business cycles, the performance of the
business sector has important implications in the assessment
of what leverage fiscal and monetary policies have on cyclical
movements.
Moreover, the general mechanism for generating cyclical
movements using fiscal and monetary policy tools in supply
side management works through the industrial sector which
responds to incentives and disincentives emanating from such
policy measures. It follows that what happens in the industrial
sector says much about the efficacy of the policy package in
vogue.
Looking more closely at the industrial sector during the past
six years, one sees a little silver lining in the shape ofa positive
annual average growth rate of manufacturing production. It is
I. 9 per cent for the period 1980-1985. The silver lining tends
to fade away against a background of an insignificant

The Public Sector Deficit

It has been conclusively established that there is a strong and
direct relationship between the size of the public sector deficit
and monetary instability, at least in the Nigerian case. (See
(5, 10,11)). Because of the dominant role Government plays
as employer and consumer of resources and the given fiscal
mechanism for dispensing the foreign exchange resources of
an essentially mono-cultural economy, the size of the public
sector deficit has become an important, if not the determining
factor in the growth of monetary aggregates in Nigeria.
Between 1980 and 1985 the budget deficits of the Federal
Government as a proportion of total estimated revenue
averaged 37.6 per cent. (See Table 4). And in the last three
years, it averaged 46.6 per cent. For the whole period there was
no year the Federal Government was able to balance its budget.
This means the Federal Government has actually been
spending far more than it has been receiving, thus fuelling
inflationary pressures, if inadvertently.
The performance of the State Governments has been more
pathetic. On the average their combined deficit as a proportion
of estimated total revenue, averaged 90.6 per cent. (See Table
5). In fact, for the years 1982 and 1983, the deficit alone
was actually higher than revenue by 46.4 and 47.2 per cent
respectively. This means that, for those two years, total
expenditure was more than double total revenue!
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The External Trade Balance
In an open economy with a substantial external sector and
in which most industrial inputs are imported, the external
trade balance will have a lot to say about the performance
of the domestic economy. If the current account balance is
persistently unfavourable, it means the country is paying out
more than it is receiving on current transactions. This, of
course, means a depletion of reserves unless capital inflows
come to the rescue. If such adverse condition continues for a
long time, pressure will be mounted on the external value
of the domestic currency. This may result in either outright
devaluation or a gradual depreciation of the currency; either
of which generates inflationary pressures. If the authorities
refuse to do both sufficiently, an illegal fringe market may
develop which somehow works a big drain on official reserves
anyway.
Considering the period, 1980 to 1985, there were three years
in which the external current account balance was
unfavourable. These were 1981, 1982 and 1983. (See Table 6).
The total deficit (or net outflow) during those three years was
Nl2,037.9 million while the total surplus (or net inflow) for
the remaining three years was N3,778.2 million. This means
that the period saw a net outflow of N8,259. 7 million which
represents the extent to which foreign exchange reserves would
be depleted in the absence of capital flows. Luckily, capital
flows ameliorated the severe impact these current account
transactions would have had on the reserve position. During
the period, reserve movements showed a total increase of
N4,3 l 8. l million and a total decrease ofN4, 720.4 million.
Hence the reserves were depleted only to the tune ofN402.3
million.

Lesson One: Conventional tools of monetary control have
limited efficacy under conditions of economic and social
underdevelopment. In fact the resort to direct control measures
in Nigeria is a tacit admission that conventional tools are
inadequate. The level of differentiation and articulation of
sectors and markets does not, as yet, permit an efficient
regulation of monetary and financial activities with tools such
as open market operations and manipulation of the discount
rate.
Lesson Two: Even when one hundred per cent success is
achieved through direct control of the banking system, such as
by the use of credit guidelines, the monetary authority would
have controlled only an insignificant proportion of the
aggregate stock of money in the economy.
In any case one hundred per cent success has never been
achieved in the control of commercial and merchant banks.
Lesson Three: Supply-side factors are becoming increasingly
potent in determining the general price level, and aggregate
demand management alone cannot adequately control
inflation in Nigeria.
Lesson Four: The most important and yet most difficult
single macro-economic aggregate to control in Nigeria is
Government's expenditure. In fact, Government deficit is a
big factor in Nigeria's monetary stability.
Lesson Five: To achieve any significant positive result and
to sustain it, there must be a realistic package of policies
(monetary, fiscal and others) accompanied by the will to
implement them effectively.
V SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this discussion, effort has been made to avoid the familiar
path of a mere recounting of events, but to look at the whole
issue rather analytically in the context of the challenges posed
by the fact of eonomic and social underdevelopment. The
framework for the analysis has deliberately included the issue
of policy instruments, targets and objectives so that readers
can more easily visualise the problem in a dynamic setting.

IV LESSONS FROM OUR EXPERIENCE
In its opening paragraph, the Annual Report of the Central
Bank of Nigeria for 1984 has this to say: "The Nigerian
economy remained depressed in 1984, although there were
encouraging improvements in some major sectors". How much
blame should be apportioned to monetary and fiscal policies
for the "continued depression" and how much credit should
they be given for the "encouraging improvements" noticed in
1984, or in any other year for that matter?
The brief general appraisal done in Section III above,
perhaps may give some clues as to how these questions should
be answered given the Nigerian experience of the past few
years. Whatever the verdict, some important lessons should
be learnt from what has resulted from our experience so far in
designing, implementing and monitoring monetary and fiscal
policies since the end of the civil war. It has not been possible
here to present a detailed analysis of how these lessons have
been arrived at. But anyone sufficiently familiar with the
Nigerian situation will aggree that the following lessons are a
direct fallout from an inside knowledge of what makes the
economy tick.

Attempt has also been made to highlight the specific
monetary and fiscal policy measures which have been pursued
in Nigeria in recent years. In doing so attention was drawn to
the issues of continuity and shifts in policy stance. The entire
package of policies has also been appraised as basis for drawing
lessons. The lessons that have been drawn are based on actual
experience in Nigeria and the results obtained from a
dispassionate analysis of facts and figures, the type normally
available to an insider.
It is now left for the reader to assess for himself what
importance to assign to monetary and fiscal policies in the
design of overall macro-economic management strategy
suitable for Nigeria.
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Year,

Federal

Table 1
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

At Current
Factor Cost
N Million

Period
1970/71 .................................. .
1971/72 .................................. .
1972/73 .................................. .
1973/74 ................................. ..
1974/75 .................................. .
1975/76 .................................. .
1976/77 .................................. .
1977/78 .................................. .
1978/79 .................................. .
1979/80 .................................. .
1980 ........................................ .
1981 ........................................ .
1982 ........................................ .
1983 ........................................ .
1984 ....................................... ..
1985* ...................................... .

At Constant
1977/78
Factor Cost
N Million

%Change

5,205.1
6,570.7
7,208.3
10,990.7
18,298.3
20,957.0
26,656.6
31,283.4
33,375.3
39,933.6
47,040.9
50,658.3
53,859.4
53,347.2
55,249.2
58,346.3

19,422.0
21,453.3
22,811.124,168.5
27,120.4.
26,479.8
27,259.5
31,283.4
29,443.1
31,220.4
30,325.2
29,907.5
29,909.2
27,359.9
25,854.2
26,472.5

26.2
9.7
52.5
66.5
14.5
27.2
17.4
6.7
19.7
17.8
7.7
6.3
-1.0
3.6
5.6

%Change

10.5
6.3
6.0
12.2
-2.4
2.9
14.8
-5.9
6.0
-2.9
-1.4
-8.5
-5.5
2.4

GDP
Deflator
1977/78
= 100
26.8
30.5
31.6
45.5
67.4
79.1
97.8
100.0
113.4
127.9
155.1
159.8
170.9
172.9
180.3

%Change
13.8
3.6
44.0
48.1
17.4
23.6
2.2
13.4
12.8
21.3
3.0
6.9

1.2
4.3

Source: Federal Office of Statistics Lagos
*Estimates of the National Planning Office, Lagos.

Table 2
INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

1980 ............................ .
1981 ............................ .
1982 ............................ .
1983 ............................ .
1984' .......................... ..
1985' .......................... ..

Manuf.

%Change

344.7
394.9
447.0
319.0
280.8
334.8

14.6
13.2
-28.6
-12.0
19.2

Mining

(1972 = 100)

%Change

Electricity

%Change

-30.5
-10.4
-4.3
13.1
6.7

271.7
324.7
344.8
352.8
316.5
334.3

19.5
6.2
2.3
-10.3
5.6

113.0
78.5
70.3
67.3
76.1
81.2

'Revised
'CBN Estimates
Source: Derived from F.O.S., NNPC and NEPA data.
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Total of all
Sectors
190.8
185.5
206.7
154.6
147.0
168.4

%Change
-2.8
11.4
-25.2
-4.9
14.6

Table 3
Consumer Price Index
(1975 = 100)

Year
1970 ........................................ .
1971 ........................................ .
1972 ........................................ .
1973 ........................................ .
1974 ........................................ .
1975 ........................................ .
1976 ........................................ .
1977 ........................................ .
1978 ........................................ .
1979 ........................................ .
1980 ........................................ .
1981 ........................................ .
1982 ........................................ .
1983 ........................................ .
1984 ........................................ .
1985 ........................................ .

Inflation
Rate

150.6
174.1
179.6
189.3
214.7
287.4
348.2
143.0
166.7
186.3
204.8
247.5
266.5
328.4
458.4
483.7

13.8
15.6
3.2
5.4
13.4
33.9
21.2
15.4
16.6
11.8
9.9
20.9
7.7
23.2
39.6
5.5

Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos.

Table 4
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET DEFICITS

1980
I.
2.
3.
4.

Revenue (Nm.) ................
Expenditure (Nm.) ...........
Deficits (Nm.) ..................
(3 + 1)% ............................

15,234.0
14,113.9
-1,975.2
13.0

1981
11,978.9
10,774.4
-3,708.5
31.0

1982

1983

1984

1985

11,748.8
12,378.5
-4,888.1
41.6

9,306.7
11,664.6
-6,103.7
65.6

11,331.7
10,342.6
-3,598.7
31.8

11,237.0
11,569.5
-4,776.6
42.5

Source: CBN Annual Reports

Table 5
STATE GOVERNMENTS BUDGET DEFICITS

1980
I.
2.
3.
4.

Revenue (Nm.) ................
Expenditure (Nm.) ...........
Deficits (Nm.) ..................
(3 + 1)% ····························

3,938.8
7,334.4
-3,295.6
83.7

1981
6,108.3
10,990.9
-4,882.6
79.9

Source: CBN Annual Reports
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1982

1983

1984

1985

4,335.4
10,680.5
-6,345.1
146.4

4,647.1
11,485.4
-6,838.3
147.2

4,503.5
7,064.9
-2,561.7
56.9

5,427.0
7,017.7
-1,590.7
29.3

Table 6
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS - SUMMARY STATEMENT
(~'million 1980-85)

Category

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985'

CURRENT ACCOUNT ...............................................
Merchandise ······························································
Exports .......................................................................
Imports .......................................................................
Service and Income (Net) ..........................................
Unrequited transfers ..................................................
LONG-TERM CAPITAL (NET) ..................................
Direct Investment ......................................................
Portfolio Investment .................................................
Other capital (long-term) (Net) .................................
Official ·······································································
Other ..........................................................................
Balance on Current Account and Long-term Capital
(Basic Balance) .......................................................
OTHER CAPITAL (Short-term) (Net) .........................
Balance on Current and Capital Accounts ................
Balancing Item ...........................................................
Overall Balance ..........................................................
Reserve Movement' ..................................................
Stock of Reserves .......................................................

2,355.3
6,132.7
14,186.0
-8,053.3
-3,462.2
-315.2
-48.0
-404.1

-3,998.4
-703.5
11,023.3
-11,726.8
-2,948.4
-346.5
833.1
334.7

-4,879.5
-1,810.2
8,206.4
-10,016.6
-2,779.9
-289.4
1,026.8
290.0

-3,160.0
- 781.4
7,502.5
-8,283.9
-2,092.8
-285.8
+1,373.8
+264.3

+94.6
+2,299.8
9,088.0
-6,788.2
-1,951.4
-253.8
-39.3
+144.5

+1,328.3
+3,825.9
+11,214.8
+7,388.9
-2,497.6
-232.0
-35.3
+311.8

356.1
330.3
25.8

498.4
480.0
18.4

736.8
720.3
16.5

1,109.5
1,092.1
17.4

-183.8
-432.2
+248.4

-347.1
-472.7
+125.6

2,307.3
145.4
2,452.7
-50.5
+2,402.2
-2,402.2
5,469.1

-3, 165.3
96.4
-3,068.9
48.1
-3,020.8
+3,020.8
2,424.8

-3,852.7
2,444.1
-1,408.6
10.3
-1,398.3
+1,398.3
1,026.5

-1,786.2
+1,361.4
-424.8
+123.5
-301.3
+301.3
676.7

+55.3
+106.1
+ 161.4
+193.4
+354.8
-354.8
1,054.4

+1,293.0
-167.0
+894.0
-332.9
+561.1
-561.1
1,619.3

' Provisional
' Minus (-) sign indicates increase in assets/decrease in liabilities. Plus sign (+) indicates decrease in assets/increase in liabilities.
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PROBLEMS OF MONETARY AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN ECOWAS 1

S. E. OMORUYP
Abstract
The paper examines the problems of monetary and financial
integration in the ECOWAS sub-region. It traces the origins
of these problems to the post-colonial era when sentimental
attachment to issues of sovereignty, development of national
currencies and the imposition of payments restrictions took
their roots. Given the background of these problems, the
paper makes a number of recommendations, such as the
need to adopt a common currency and more realistic
exchange rates, for forging greater monetary co-operation in
the sub-region.

potentialities of the community for realising the global
objective of raising the standard of living of the ECOWAS
citizens and of contributing to Africa's development. A major
channel for achieving this as contained in the Treaty includes
the elimination of all types of obstacles to the free movement
of goods, capital and persons.
However, there are a number of constraints, economic, social
and political, that are likely to limit the quick realisation of the
economic union. The focus of this paper is largely on the
monetary and financial constraints. For purposes of easy
exposition, the paper has been divided into five parts. Part
I highlights the theoretical concepts of integration. Part II
discusses early attempts at monetary integration. Part III
focusses on the problems of integration. Part IV highlights the
institutional arrangement, the West African Clearing House
(WACH), designed to accelerate integration efforts. Part V
contains the paper's conclusions and recommendations for
policy.

Introduction

Since the inception of the Economic Community of West
African States on May 28, 1975 and the later adoption of the
protocols in Accra, the community has continued to grapple
with problems. A great many public servants and African
scholars in particular have dwelt exhaustively on the

PART I
to each other even though the rates may, in unison,
vary relative to non-union currencies; and

Concept of monetary integration

Monetary integration is the monetary unification of
participating member countries in an ecomonic union and
involves the adoption of common currency, co-ordinated
exchange-rate policies, and harmonization of fiscal and
monetary policies.' It is a process that can only be envisaged
during the final stages of economic integration.
The final stages are those ofan "economic union" and "total
economic integration".• Under the stage ofan economic union,
restrictions on commodity and factor movements are
abolished among member states and some degree of
harmonization of economic, monetary, fiscal and social
policies is undertaken. The highest degree of economic
integration - the last stage - is total economic integration
which involves the unification of monetary, fiscal, social and
other policies and requires the establishment of a
supra-national agency whose decisions are binding on all
member states.
Corden' is agreeable with Nana-Sinkam on the above
definition of monetary integration but emphasizes that the
concept essentially involves:
(i)
an exchange-rate union, ie. an area within which
exchange rates bear a permanently fixed relationship

(ii)

convertibility - the permanent absence of all
exchange controls, whether for current or capital
transactions, within the area.

Thus the adoption of fixed exchange-rate margins among
the currencies of member states, or the adoption of a common
single currency, the pooling of foreign exchange reserves, a
common Central Bank, factor mobility and harmonization of
monetary and fiscal policies are the key ingredients ofa durable
monetary union.
There is, however, a related but wider concept of financial
integration. This is the integration of organised or formal
capital markets such as the Stock exchange in the participating
member countries of the economic union. Such integration
would involve a harmonization of regional financial markets,
particularly with respect to interest rates on securities and
capital transactions. Financial integration also involves
co-ordination of trading in community securities, of issuance
of financial instruments to finance community projects at
agreed locations, etc.•

'Also presented at the 4th Biennial Conference of the West African Economic Association held at Lome, Togo in March, 1987.
'Mr. S. E. Omoruyi is Deputy Director of Research, Research Department, Central Bank of Nigeria.
'S. C. Nana-Sinkam. Monetary Integratton and Theory of Optional Currency Areas in Africa, Mouton Publishers I 978, The Hague.
'The first three stages of economic integration identified in the literature are the free trade area where tariffs and other trade restrictions between members
are abolished; the Customs Union which involves the abolition of discrimination in movements of commodities and the erection of a common tariff wall
against non-members; the third stage is the common market where trade restrictions and impediments to factor movement are abolished.
'Corden, W. M., Monetary Integration, Essays in International Finance, N.93, Princeton University; Princeton, I 972 P.2.
'Basch. A.. Capital Jfarkets oft he European Economic Community- Problems oflntegration, Graduate School of Business Administration, The University
ofMichigan. 1965.
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PART II
Frnch-speaking countries of West Africa to form a monetary
union, namely, the West African Monetary Union (Union
Monetaire l'Ouest Africaine - UMOA), embracing Benin,
Ivory Coast, Niger, Mauritania,' Senegal, Upper Volta (now
Bourkina Fasso) and Togo. The powers of BCEAO were
widened to include the functions of a common Central bank
for the seven member states. The bank's functions include the
issue of a common currency, the Communaute Financiere
Africaine or CFA Franc. Some other features of this Bank are
as follows:
(i)
The CFA Franc is fixed to French Franc and equals
0.02 of the French Franc; or 50 CFA Franc to l French
Franc;
(ii) The external reserves of all the participating countries
are pooled under the control of BCEAO and are held
exclusively in the form of French Francs;
(iii) Payments and receipts in foreign currency of the
BCEAO are settled through an account called the
Operations Account with the French Treasury;
(iv) France guarantees unlimited conversion of the CFA
Franc into French Franc. This guarantee operates
through the French Treasury providing automatic
overdraft facilities to the BCEAO especially when the
Operations Account goes into red;
(v) In line with other Central banks in the Anglophone
area, the BCEAO is empowered to exercise credit
controls and to prescribe credit ceilings not only for
each country but also within each country for each
bank and enterprise. The BCEAO can also vary the
rediscount rate and it can also prescribe liquidity ratios
for banks;
(vi) The monetary management system ofthe UMOA does
not permit exchange rate changes as a policy option
nor is there freedom for individual countries to pursue
unco-ordinated monetary expansion. Rather the
member countries have accepted the beneficial
discipline arising from the collective use of strict fiscal,
monetary and pricing policies for the management of
their economies;
(vii) The development of the less developed members of
UMOA is encouraged by a resource transfer strategy
that employs a less stringent application of the fiscal
rules on such countries. This process is further directly
assisted by the industrial redistribution strategies of
the West African Development Bank (BOAD), the
investment banking counterpart of the BCEAO within
UMOA.
The UMOA arrangement remains in force although Guinea,
Mali and Mauritania broke away from the franc zone at
different times. However, Mali re-entered the union in July,
1984.
In what follows a discussion of the numerous problems
of monetary integration including monetary credit and fiscal
disharmony emanating from the above post-independence
monetary systems of the sub-region, is undertaken.

Monetary zones in the sub-region

Having discussed, albeit briefly, the theoretical concepts of
monetary and financial integration, we shall in this section
dwell on monetary zones in the sub-region - the source of
major problems of monetary integration.
Sterling Monetary Zone

The Currency Board system marked the beginning of
monetary integration in British West Africa. For approximately
fifty years, monetary integration was operated but it had
defects. Commenting on the Board system, J. Mars,1 a writer
on colonial currency system observed that:
The West African Currency Board is in fact not a money
issuing bank with power to vary the amount of currency at
will but merely a passive money changer which receives
superior money ie. London sterling and gives in return token
money ie. West African Currency.
However, with the advantage ofhindsight the currency Board
system had some merit. It provided confidence in the currency
and ensured to a large extent stability in the internal and
external value of the local currency, for instance, and was
convertible in all parts of Africa and Europe through its link
to sterling. It also provided a good basis for economic
integration of the member countries.
The Franc Monetary Zone

Before 1945 the currency arrangement evolved by France
for her colonial territories in West Africa was handled by the
Bank of West Africa established in 190 l exclusively to issue
Franc notes into circulation in French West Africa colonies.'
The Bank which absorbed the Bank of Senegal established
earlier in 1856, had its head office in Paris, with branches in
Conakry, Port Novo, Dakar, Grand-Bassam and Duala.
In 1955, the right of note issue was, however, transferred
from the Bank of West Africa to a publicly-owned institution
Institut d'Emission de l'Afrique Occidentale Francaise et du
Togo. This bank was given an additional function of a bank of
last resort. Its name was changed to la Banque Centrale des
Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO) in 1959
The Currency System of the Post-Independence period

Soon after the attainment of political independence by
countries of West Africa, the colonial currency system ofBritish
West Africa crumbled in the wake of establishment of national
Central banks in all West African countries as well as
indigenous and state-owned commercial and development
banks. During this period, Ghana departed in 1957 from the
inherited systems of monetary integration by pulling out of the
West African Currency Board system. She was followed by
Nigeria in 1959, Sierra Leone in 1963, and The Gambia in
1975. The abandonment of currency integration policies in
British West African countries reflected largely the desire of
those countries to assert political independence, thus bringing
an end to the pre-independence monetary integration that
existed in the Anglo-phone zone.
On May 12, 1961, France concluded an agreement on
economic, financial and monetary co-operation with the

'J. Mars. Mining, Banking and Commerce in Nigeria, 1948.
'The French West Africa consisted of Dahomey (now Benin), Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta (now Bourkina-Fasso).
Togo was later included.
'Mauritania withdrew from the union in 1972.
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PART III
ECO WAS have been identified. (See Table I, Appendix). These
include currencies that are pegged to major traded currencies;
currencies that are pegged to the SDR; currencies that are
pegged to a basket of currencies; and finally, currencies of which
the exchange rate is determined by a managed or independent
float. The regimes have implications for the degrees of
overvaluation or undervaluation of the various currencies. The
francophone member countries of the UMOA group tend to
maintain undervalued exchange rates whereas different
degrees ofovervaluation characterise the exchange rate regimes
of the Anglophone members of ECO WAS - Ghana, Nigeria
and Sierra Leone. Interestingly, the non-UMOA countries of
The Gambia, Liberia and Mauritania tend to maintain
currencies that are substantially undervalued.' There is then
the problem of arriving at an exchange rate for each member
country currency that would "equilibrate" the balance of
payments not only for her economy but for the sub-regional
economy as a whole.

Problems of monetary and fiscal disharmony
Monetary constraints
It was mentioned in Part I of this paper that while the

French-speaking countries in the UMOA in the sub-region
continue to use the CFA franc as their common currency,
countries in British West Africa adopted their individual
currencies soon after attaining political independence. The
multiplicity of these currencies and the inconvertibility of most
of them create problems for payments arrangements and
inter-state commercial transactions. Currency inconvertibility
impedes a free flow of goods and services and capital
movements and unilateral transfers. Thus, ECOWAS member
states have had to settle most of their foreign trade balance in
scarce non-regional currencies such as the Pound Sterling, the
French Franc and the U.S. dollar.
The best way to avoid the above problems is to adopt a
monetary union. However, the road to monetary union is a very
difficult one: For instance, under a monetary union individual
member countries would forgo their rights to determine their
credit policy. Instead such policy would have to be determined
by a centralised body. Here we are faced by the problem of
ascertaining the rate of credit expansion that is adequate for
each economy.
A monetary union calls for uniformity in interest rates in
order to avoid distortions from capital flows within the union.
Again, this is problematic since in reality the same interest rate
cannot meaningfully hold for each country in the sub-region.
An appropriate interest rate level in one country may be
inappropriate for another, given differing levels of
infrastructural development. Thus the problem of
harmonization of interest rates constitutes a major constraint
to monetary integration.

It will be observed that member countries ofECOWAS are
at different levels ofeconomic development. Thus maintaining
a common exchange rate in line with the requirements of a
monetary union could result in undesirable distortions, as the
common rate may tend to favour some member countries.'
Problems of financial integration

Financial integration involves the harmonization of the
capital markets in the sub-region. It suggests inter alia the need
for member states to streamline real interest rates on securities
of the same type and quality throughout the community. It
also calls for elimination of any asymmetries that exist in
the interest rates charged on capital transactions. Financial
integration also suggests the need for joint issuance of financial
in~truments when the need to finance community projects
anses.

Fiscal Policy Constraints

In the sub-region there exists a panoply of different tariff
arrangements with differing rates of customs duties. The duties
are designed partly to earn increased revenue for government
and partly to shield domestic industries from competition from
foreign producers. In a monetary union, there is the problem
of lowering of tariff walls under the union policy of trade
liberalisation. This problem derives from the fact that most
countries of the sub-region depend largely on customs and
excise duties as sources ofrevenue.
There are asymmetries in overall tax structures in the
sub-region and size of government budgets varies from country
to country. There is then the problem of devising ways of
harmonizing the tax structures, sizes of government budgets
including different profiles of overall borrowing requirements
of each government in the union.

Besides the obvious problems inherent in the above, largely
problems of implementation, there are in ECOWAS member
countries a number of legislations discriminating against
foreign securities or against the export of domestic securities.
These laws have to be reviewed; in particular, company law
and tax laws need to be harmonized.
Political problem

Although ECOWAS is eleven years old, nation states in the
community still seem to guard their sovereignty. An integration
problem would arise where the expected co-operation in
implementing agreed-upon protocols is not forthcoming from
member states because of their strong attachment to notions
of sovereignty. Thus the pace and successful implementation
of monetary integration in the community would depend
largely on political will.

Exchange rate constraints

There exist different exchange rate regimes' in the
sub-region. By and large, four exchange rate regimes in

'An exchange rate regime may be defined as or denoted by the system or method by which the exchange rate is determined.
'ECOWAS. Creation o(a Single ECO!,US Jfonctarr Zone. Lagos February. 1986. (Unpublished ECOWAS Study).
'S. M. Nsouli. Ibid. P.44.
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PART IV
Problems of the West African Clearing House (WACH)

Problems of WACH

An analysis of the problems of monetary integration would
be incomplete if mention is not made of an institutional
arrangement - the WACH - established and designed to
foster monetary co-operation within the sub-region. This
section therefore discusses the WACH and the problems
encountered in its efforts at promoting sub-regional limited
currency convertibility.'
Established in 1975 under an agreement by the West African
Central Banks, the WACH had the following aims and
objectives:
(a) to promote the use of the currencies of the members
of the Clearing House' for sub-regional trade and other
transactions;
(b) to bring about economies in the use of foreign reserves
of members of the Clearing House;
(c) to encourage the members of the Clearing House to
liberalise trade among their respective countries;
(d) to promote monetary co-operation and consultation
among the members of the Clearing House.
Of these objectives, the most important, at least, from the
point of view of this paper, is that of the promotion of
convertibility ofregional currencies and thereby the saving in
the use of foreign exchange such as the U.S. dollar, Pound
Sterling, French Franc, etc. However, being themselves very
conscious of the shortage of convertible currencies in the
region, the Central Banks were of the view that the best means
of ensuring regional convertibility was to enforce prompt
settlement. Therefore, the settlement rules in WACH were
designed to ensure the minimum of delay.
Unlike some clearing systems in other third world regions'
WACH made no provision for the creation of a fund or direct
bilateral contributions to facilitate the settlement of protracted
debtor balances. The credits available in the system are related
to volumes of previous transactions and stipulate a country
minimum of500,000 WAUA• (West African Unit of Account)
for debit positions and 1,000,000 WAUA for creditors. All
debtor positions are expected to be settled monthly and
promptly on demand and not later than 15 days after the month
to which the debt relates. The WACH's function is to monitor
these transactions in a capacity little more than that of an
accounting office.'

A major problem which frustrates the realisation of the
principal objective of the WACH, namely, promotion oflarger
use of regional currencies in regional transactions, has been the
observed low and reducing volumes of compensable trade.•
This means that adequate volumes of intra-regional exports
do not compensate the volume ofimports and vice-versa. Thus
trade between the member countries was not balanced, so that
very large amounts of merchandise trade still had to be settled
by the use of external (non-regional) convertible currencies,
(see Tables 2 and 3).
As is evident in Table 2, trade imbalances were, for instance
in 1980, most pronounced in intra-regional trade relations with
Nigeria, Ghana, Mauritania and Sierra Leone. Thus the need
for non-regional currencies for the settlement of trade with
those countries was quite high as figures in column 5 of the
Table show. The observation was also true for the UMOA
countries as a group. The analysis in Table 3 line 9 shows
that in the WACH the percentage of transactions that require
non-regional currencies to settle trended upward in the
quinquennium 1976-1980. Since 1980 there has been no
reversal of the trend. Thus the achievement of the cardinal
objective of limited currency convertibility has eluded the
WACH mechanism.
A related problem confronting the WACH has been the
accumulation of debtor balances. This again contradicts an
important condition for limited convertibilty of soft currencies
within the clearing house, namely, the undertaking at Central
bank level for prompt settlement as advised by the Clearing
House in accordance with the provisions of Articles VIII and
IX of the Clearing House Agreement. The debts have been
owed largely to BCEAO and National Bank of Liberia.
The reality, however, that WACH is merely a clearing agency
has not helped matters. This is so because the WACH has no
provision in the Agreement for the creation of a fund or direct
bilateral contributions to facilitate the settlement of debtor
balances. Thus, as presently constituted the WACH mechanism
is fraught with difficulties that constrain its role as an
instrument of monetary co-operation in the sub-region.

'Limited currency convertibility may be defined as "the unrestricted exchange and use of the currencies of countries within the region vis-a-vis each other
ie. where all exchange restrictions vis-a-vis the other currencies of the group have been eliminated". For further details see IMF, Currencv Convertibilitv in
·
·
the Economic Community of West African States, 1980 (Unpublished IMF Study for Executive Secretariat ofECOWAS).
'The list of member Central Banks of the WACH is as follows: Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). Central Bank of The Gambia (Gambank),
Bank of Ghana (Ghanabank), Central Bank of the Republic of Guinea (Bareg), National Bank of Guinea Bissau (Banguine), National Bank of Liberia
(Batbank), Central Bank pf Mauritania (Rimbank), Central Bank of Nigeria (Cenbank) and Bank of Sierra Leone (Coppersafe).
'Examples of clearing systems with credit facilities include the CARICOM Multilateral Clearing facility established in 1977 for member states of the
Caribbean Community; the Central American Clearing House (1981 ), the ALA DI Clearing System established in 1969 and revised in 1981 for the eleven
Latin American countries.
'l WAUA=SDR I
'J. Frimpong Ansah, A Preliminary Study on Financing Mechanisms at Central Bank level in the ECO WAS Sub-region in support of a process of Trade
Libera/i::ation and for the settlement of Debtor Balances in the lies/ African Clearing House; UNCTAD Study Project RAF/77/032, February 1983
(Unpublished mimeo).
'Compensable trade is the volume of merchandise transactions which go through the clearing mechanism and which are settled in regional currencies. The
concept is different from that of"settled trade" which is the proportion ofECOWAS regional total trade that is settled in convertible non-regional currencies
such as the U.S. dollar, Pound Sterling, etc.
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PARTY
Conclusions and Recommendations
This paper has examined the problems of monetary and
financial integration in the ECOWAS sub-region. In the
process, it made forays into early attempts at monetary
co-operation through institutional arrangements such as the
BCEAO- the common Central bank of the francophone West
African countries - and the defunct West African Currency
Board which served the Anglophone countries in the
sub-region. However, with the attainment of political
independence by the nation states of ECOWAS, the
Anglophone countries among them established their
individual Central banks and abandoned the West African
Currency Board system.
Such was the genesis of the current problems of the
sub-regional monetary and fiscal disharmony. The assertion
of the freedom of independence and the needs for economic
management of fledgling economies, particularly among the
Anglophone countries were reflected in the establishment of
various national currencies and the emergence of payment
restrictions designed to protect nationalistic interests. The
sentimental attachment to issues of sovereignty, development
of national currencies, and existence of exchange rate regimes
and payments restrictions have featured prominently in the
mainstream of problems that could frustrate the achievement
of a monetary union in the sub-region.
The paper has also discussed the WACH mechanism which
is an institutional arrangement designed to foster intra-regional
trade through inter alia the promotion of the use of currencies
of member countries ofECOWAS. Even so, this instrument of
monetary co-operation is beset with problems: they range from
excessive recourse to use of non-regional currencies following
the observed low and reducing volumes of compensable trade
to WACH's inability to arrest the accumulation of debtor
balances through prompt settlement.
Therefore, in order to minimise the above problems and
forge monetary co-operation for purposes of increased
intra-regional trade and enhanced standards of living of
citizens in the community, the following recommendations are
suggested:
1.
In view of the serious problems inherent in the
existence of many currencies with varying degrees of
convertibility, there is need to adopt a common
currency. The common currency may be modelled
after the UMOA common currency system. The
current ECOWAS study on the creation of a single
ECOWAS monetary zone should be pursued
vigorously with a view to finding a suitable way of

adopting a common currency and resolving the
common currency guarantee problem;
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2.

Given the need to attract increased trade to WACH,
illegal border trade would have to be seriously
curtailed through the adoption by member countries
of more realistic and market-related exchange rates.
Such rates could also minimise considerably the
problems of overvaluation of national currencies,
especially those of the Anglophone countries.
Countries in the ECOWAS sub-region may thus have
to accept to undergo the discipline of exchange rates
adjustments through substantial devaluations of their
currencies;

3.

Considering the existence of disharmony in member
countries' monetary, credit and fiscal policies, some
form of harmonization is required in these areas to
serve the overall interests of member countries of the
sub-region;

4.

The WACH would further the achievement of limited
currency convertibility if it is endowed with capacity
to provide short-term financial support or credit to
clear debit positions in situations of temporary
liquidity shortage of debtor countries. This will
encourage member countries to increase and liberalise
their intra-regional trade as they can find an assured
source of short-term trade finance. The burden of
creditor countries in extending involuntary short-term
credit will also be lightened. Thus WACH would be
not only a clearing but also a settlement agency. It
should be noted, however, that given the seemingly
permanent debtor positions of some member
countries, the creation of a special fund to finance
the deficits may serve only as mere palliatives to the
problem;

5.

There is need for member states to exercise a greater
degree of co-operation than is the case at present,
such that agreements regarding protocols, etc. are not
frustrated by lack of political will to implement them.
Certainly, implementation would involve, in some
cases, surrender of part of absolute sovereignty; but
this short-term cost is inevitable so long as member
states are really determined to forge a monetary union
with all expectations of long-term benefits to the
community.
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Appendix
Table I
Types of Exchange Regimes in ECO WAS

Country

Pegged to Major
Currencies

Benin
Cape Verde
The Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Ivory Coast
Liberia
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Upper Volta
(now Bourkina Fasso)

Pegged to
SDR

Pegged toa
Basket of
Currencies

Flexible
Exchange Rate

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X = indicates applicable exchange rate regime.
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Table 2
ECOWAS REGIONAL TRADE (INCLUSIVE OF OIL)
THEORETICAL MAXIMUM COMPENSABLE TRADE
$ million

1980

Imports
(I)

UMOA
(incl. Mali') ...........................
Cape Verde ............................
Gambia .................................
Ghana ....................................
Guinea ...................................
Guinea-Bissau .......................
Liberia ...................................
Mauritania ............................
Nigeria...................................
Sierra Leone ..........................

136.05
0.40
5.76
241.00
3.88
2.74
12.50
2.78
83.00
53.52

TOTAL. .................................

541.63

Exports
(2)

Total
(3)

67.12

203.17
0.40
11.96
281.40
5.56
422
22.30
2.84
531.00
53.52

6.20
40.40
1.68
1.48
9.80
0.06
448.00
574.74

1,116.37

Compensable
(4)
(lower x 2)
134.24
11.52
80.80
3.36
2.96
19.60
0.12
166.00
418.60

Settled
(5)
(3-4)

%
Settled
(6)
(5+3)

68.93
0.40
0.44
200.60
2.20
1.26
2.70
2.72
365.00
53.52

33.93
100.00
3.68
71.29
39.57
29.86
12.11
95.77
68.74
100.00

697.77

62.50

Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Year Book, IMF 1981

' Excludes intra UMOA-Mali trade.

Table 3
PERFORMANCE OF THE WEST AFRICAN CLEARING HOUSE
(TRADE INCLUSIVE OF OIL)
Calendar Year Million WAVA ( = SDR)

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

Exports (FOB) .................................................................................. .
Imports (CIF) ................................................................................... .
Total Intra-regional Trade (I+ 2) ...................................................... .
Compensable trade ........................................................................... .
% Compensable trade (4+3) ............................................................. .

251.29
222.77
474.06
225.89
47.56

307.57
342.01
649.58
281.21
43.29

286.24
278.88
565.13
247.50
43.80

340.71
323.53
564.24
272.86
41.08

438.01
412.78
850.79
319.78
37.58

6. Total transactions channelled through WACH ................................ .
7. Of which trade transactions channelled .......................................... .
8. Transactions cleared ......................................................................... .
9. Transactions cleared as% of total transactions (8+6) ..................... .
10. Trade transactions as% of total transactions channelled (7+6) ...... .
11. Trade channelled as% of total intra-regional trade (7+3) ............... .
12. Trade channelled as% of compensable trade (7+4) ........................ .

18.40'
10.90'
4.27
23.21'
59.24

45.20
35.00
13.09
28.96
77.43
5.39
12.45

52.00
35.70
14.15
27.21
68.65
6.32
14.42

72.82
45.52
18.04
24.77
62.51
6.85
16.68

162.69
50.42
23.70
14.57
30.99
5.93
15.77

I.
2.
3.
4.
5.

'Covers only last 6 months of 1976
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Year Book, IMF, 1981.
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